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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) with decoy-state method is believed
to be securely applied to defeat various hacking attacks in practical quantum key distribution systems. Recently,
the coherent-state superpositions (CSS) have emerged as an alternative to single-photon qubits for quantum
information processing and metrology. Here, in this Letter, CSS are exploited as the source in MDI-QKD.
We present an analytical method which gives two tight formulas to estimate the lower bound of yield and the
upper bound of bit error rate. We exploit the standard statistical analysis and Chernoff bound to perform the
parameter estimation. Chernoff bound can provide good bounds in the long distance MDI-QKD. Our results
show that with CSS, both the security transmission distance and secure key rate are significantly improved
compared with those of the weak coherent states in the finite-data case.
OCIS codes: (270.5565)Quantum communication; (270.0270) Quantum optics.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/XX.99.099999
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] provides the
guarantee for two remote parties to share a secret key
with information-theoretic security based on the prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics [3], despite of the exis-
tence of eavesdroppers. However, there are many im-
perfections in the realistic QKD systems related to the
practical devices failing to satisfy the assumptions in
the security proof. By means of these imperfections,
various quantum hacking strategies have been proposed
to attack the existing QKD systems [4–6]. Recently,
a novel idea of measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) has been proposed [7], in which the pro-
tocol is naturally immune to all side-channel attacks on
the detectors. Since the extensively adopted WCS con-
tains multi-photon components, the decoy-state method
[8, 9] is used in the MDI-QKD to avoid photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attacks [10]. Recently, several experi-
mental demonstrations of MDI-QKD with weak coher-
ent states (WCS) have been performed [11–15]. Up to
now, the maximal experimental transmission distance is
200 km through spooled standard telecom fiber using
the decoy-state MDI-QKD [15]. Nevertheless, the im-
plementation of long distance is still a big challenge for
∗ Corresponding author: hlyin@mail.ustc.edu.cn
† Corresponding author: tychen@ustc.edu.cn
‡ Corresponding author: zbchen@ustc.edu.cn
QKD. Actually, since the WCS sources contain a large
portion of vacuum state and multi-photon components,
the transmission distance and the secure key rate are
limited.
The coherent-state superpositions (CSS) have recently
emerged as an alternative to single-photon qubits for
quantum information processing and metrology, such as
fault-tolerant linear optical quantum computation [16],
quantum teleportation [17–19], quantum repeaters [20],
hybrid long distance entanglement distribution [21] and
quantum precision measurements [22]. Furthermore, ap-
proximate CSS of small amplitudes have been generated
by photon subtraction from a squeezed vacuum state
[23], and approximate CSS of large amplitudes have been
generated from Fock states using a single homodyne de-
tection [24].
The CSS are often called Schro¨dinger cat states which
are defined as quantum superpositions of classical distin-
guishable states. It can be written as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2(1− e−2|α|2)
(|α〉 − |−α〉), (1)
where |α〉 and |−α〉 correspond to the coherent states
with the same amplitude and opposite phase. When the
phases of CSS pulses sent by Alice and Bob are ran-
domized, the states become a mixture of Fock states. In
practical system, it will have even-photon components
2for non-ideal CSS [23]. In general, the density matrix of
phase randomized non-ideal CSS can be written as
σ =
∞∑
i=0
P (i)|i〉〈i|. (2)
However, we can not know exactly P (i) because the
states are non-ideal. Here, we assume the density matrix
of phase randomized non-ideal CSS in this Letter can be
written as
ρ =
a
sinhµ
∞∑
i=0
µ2i+1
(2i+ 1)!
|2i+ 1〉〈2i+ 1|
+
1− a
coshµ
∞∑
i=0
µ2i
(2i)!
|2i〉〈2i|
=
∞∑
i=0
Pµ(i)|i〉〈i|,
(3)
a = 1 represents the CSS case; otherwise it is the non-
ideal CSS case. The fidelity of the non-ideal CSS is
√
a,
µ = |α|2 is the intensity of the CSS pulses, and Pµ(i)
represents the probability of emerged n-photon compo-
nent in the mixed state.
For simplicity, we consider the polarization-encoding
scheme of decoy state MDI-QKD protocol [7]. Alice
and Bob independently and randomly send the phase
randomized CSS pulses with the intensity µ and ν to
Charlie under basis ωA and ωB, respectively, where
ωA, ωB ∈ {Z,X} (µωA ⊎ νωB channel). Charlie per-
forms a Bell-state measurement (BSM), then he em-
ploys a public channel to announce the measurement
result. Afterwards, Alice and Bob perform basis sift,
error correction and privacy amplification to extract a
secure key. The total gain Qωµν and quantum bit error
rate Eωµν (given that Alice and Bob use CSS pulses with
µ and ν intensity, respectively, and they both choose the
same ω basis) can be written as
Qωµν =
∞∑
i,j=0
Pµ(i)Pν(j)Y
ω
ij ,
EωµνQ
ω
µν =
∞∑
i,j=0
Pµ(i)Pν(j)e
ω
ijY
ω
ij ,
(4)
where ω ∈ {Z,X}, Y ωij and eωij are the yield and bit error
rate given that Alice and Bob send out i-photon state
and j-photon state, respectively. The secure key rate is
given by [7, 25]
R = QZ11[1−H(eX11)]−QZµνfH(EZµν), (5)
where QZµνfH(E
Z
µν) is the cost of bit error, Q
Z
11H(e
X
11) is
the cost of phase error, QZ11 = Pµ(1)Pν(1)Y
Z
11 is the yield
of single-photon state. f = 1.16 is the error correction
efficiency, H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the binary Shannon entropy function. Qωµν and E
ω
µν can
be directly measured experimentally, while Qω11 and e
ω
11
need to be estimated with the decoy-state method [8, 9].
First of all, we consider the joint quantum state given
that Alice and Bob send out i-photon and j-photon state
with horizontal polarization, respectively, which can be
given by
|Ψ〉HHin = |i〉H |j〉H =
(a†
1H)
i
√
i!
(a†
2H)
j
√
j!
|0〉, (6)
where a†
1H and a
†
2H are photon creation operators with
the horizontal polarization mode. After the state goes
through the beam splitter and the polarization beam
splitter, the output quantum state will be given by
|Ψ〉HHout =
i+j∑
p=0
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−kCp−ki Ckj√
2i+ji!j!
√
p!
√
(i+ j − p)!
× |p〉
1H |0〉1V |i+ j − p〉2H |0〉2V ,
(7)
where |Ψ〉HHout can be described as superpositions of or-
thogonal states |p〉
1H |0〉1V |i+ j − p〉2H |0〉2V . Other po-
larization cases can be considered in the similar manner.
From Table 1, it is clear that QZµν contains the cor-
rect BSM result QZC (a successful BSM given that the
polarization of the pulses sent out by Alice and Bob are
different in Z basis) and the false BSM result QZE, which
can be given by
QZµν = Q
Z
C +Q
Z
E , Q
Z
C = 4Q
ψ+
HV , Q
Z
E = 4Q
ψ+
HH , (8)
where Qψ
+
HV is the successful Bell state |ψ+〉 mea-
surement results given that Alice and Bob send out
horizontal and vertical polarization pulse, respectively.
Here, we use the equalities Qψ
+
HV=Q
ψ+
VH=Q
ψ−
HV=Q
ψ−
VH
and Qψ
+
HH=Q
ψ+
V V=Q
ψ−
HH=Q
ψ−
V V due to the symmetry.
Here, Qψ
+
HH can be written as
Qψ
+
HH =
1
4
∞∑
i,j=0
Pµ(i)Pν(j)Y
HHψ+
ij ,
Y HHψ
+
ij =
i+j∑
p=0
j∑
k=0
[
DHH1H D
HH
1V (1 −DHH2H )(1−DHH2V )
+DHH2H D
HH
2V (1−DHH1H )(1−DHH1V )
]
PHHij ,
(9)
where Y HHψ
+
ij is the yield, P
HH
ij is the probability of
quantum state |p〉
1H |0〉1V |i+ j − p〉2H |0〉2V . DHH1H is
the detection probability of detectorD1H , 1/4 represents
the probability of state |HH〉 given that the pulses sent
by Alice and Bob are in the Z basis, and
PHHij =
∣∣∣∣(−1)
j−kCp−ki C
k
j√
2i+ji!j!
√
p!
√
(i+ j − p)!
∣∣∣∣
2
,
DHH1H = 1− (1− pd)(1− η)p, DHH1V = pd
DHH2H = 1− (1− pd)(1− η)i+j−p, DHH2V = pd,
(10)
3Table 1. Alice and Bob post-select the successful measurement result when they use the same basis. Here, |HH〉 represents a
state that Alice and Bob both send out horizontal polarization pulse.
√
(×) represents a correct (false) BSM result.
|HH〉 |V V 〉 |HV 〉 |V H〉 |++〉 |−−〉 |+−〉 |−+〉
∣∣ψ+
〉
bit flip × bit flip × bit flip √ bit flip √ no bit flip √ no bit flip √ no bit flip × no bit flip ×
∣
∣ψ−
〉
bit flip × bit flip × bit flip √ bit flip √ bit flip × bit flip × bit flip √ bit flip √
where pd is the dark count, η = ηd × 10−βL/20 is the
overall efficiency which contains channel transmittance
efficiency 10−βL/20 and detector efficiency ηd. The dis-
tance between Alice (Bob) and Charlie is L/2. Similarly,
QXµν can be derived as
QXµν = Q
X
C +Q
X
E , Q
X
C = 4Q
ψ+
+,+, Q
X
E = 4Q
ψ+
+,−,
(11)
where QXC and Q
X
E represent the detection probability
in the correct and false scenario, respectively. The total
quantum bit error rate of the Z and X basis can be
written as
EZµνQ
Z
µν = edQ
Z
C + (1− ed)QZE ,
EXµνQ
X
µν = edQ
X
C + (1− ed)QXE ,
(12)
where ed represents the misalignment-error probability.
We present an analytical method to acquire two tight
formulas to estimate Y ω11 and e
ω
11 with only one decoy
state for CSS and Yω11 and e
ω
11 with two decoy states
(decoy+vacuum state) for non-ideal CSS. For CSS, the
probability of even photon is Pµ(2i) = 0. µ1 = ν1 is the
signal state, µ2 = ν2 is the decoy state, and µ1 > µ2 > 0.
We will have
µ41 sinh
2 µ2Q
ω
µ2µ2 − µ42 sinh2 µ1Qωµ1µ1 = (µ41µ22 − µ42µ21)Y ω11
+
∞∑
j=2
µ41µ
m+1
2 − µ42µm+11
m!
Y ω1m +
∞∑
i=2
µ41µ
n+1
2 − µ42µn+11
n!
Y ωn1
+
∞∑
i,j=2
µ41µ
n+m
2 − µ42µn+m1
n!m!
Y ωnm ≤ (µ41µ22 − µ42µ21)Y ω11,
(13)
sinh2 µ2E
ω
µ2µ2Q
ω
µ2µ2 =
∞∑
i,j=0
µn+m2
n!m!
eωnmY
ω
nm ≥ µ22eω11Y ω11,
(14)
where we use n = 2i+1,m = 2j+1, {Y1m, Yn1, Ynm} ≥
0. So we have
Y ω11 ≥
(µ41sinh
2 µ2)Q
ω
µ2µ2 − (µ42sinh2 µ1)Qωµ1µ1
µ21µ
2
2(µ
2
1 − µ22)
,
eω11 ≤
sinh2 µ2E
ω
µ2µ2Q
ω
µ2µ2
µ22Y
ω
11
.
(15)
Similar to the procedure above, we have the lower (up-
per) bound of yield Yω11 (bit error rate e
ω
11) for non-ideal
CSS,
Y
ω
11 ≥
Pµ1 (1)Pµ1(2)g(µ2)− Pµ2(1)Pµ2(2)g(µ1)
Pµ1 (1)Pµ2(1)[Pµ2(1)Pµ1 (2)− Pµ1(1)Pµ2 (2)]
,
g(µ) =Qωµµ − Pµ(0)Qωµ0 − Pµ(0)Qω0µ + P 2µ(0)Qω00,
(16)
e
ω
11 ≤
1
P 2µ2(1)Y
ω
11
[
Eωµ2µ2Q
ω
µ2µ2 − Pµ2 (0)Eωµ20Qωµ20
− Pµ2(0)Eω0µ2Qω0µ2 + P 2µ2 (0)Eω00Qω00
]
.
(17)
Fig. 1. The secure key rates of CSS, WCS, non-ideal CSS and
SPS. We use the following practical experimental parameters
[15]: the detection efficiency ηd is 40%, the dark count pd
is 1 × 10−7, the intrinsic loss coefficient β of the standard
telecom fiber channel is 0.2 dB/km, the misalignment-error
probability ed of the system is 1.5%.
To evaluate the performance of the MDI-QKD with
CSS, we use the practical MDI-QKD experimental pa-
rameters [15]. The single-photon state (SPS), non-ideal
CSS and WCS are all used to compare with CSS. We as-
sume that the parameter a of the non-ideal CSS is 0.7,
so the fidelity of the non-ideal CSS is 83.7%. In practice,
since the resources are restrained, we should consider the
statistical fluctuation in finite-data case. The secure key
rates shown in Fig. 1 are estimated by the standard sta-
tistical analysis [25]. The data length N represents the
number of µωA⊎νωB channel. The standard deviation is
five, which implies the security bound ǫ = 5.73× 10−7.
For WCS, in the decoy+vacuum state method, the inten-
sities of signal state, decoy state and vacuum state are
set as µ1 = 0.4, µ2 = 0.07 and 0, respectively. While for
CSS, we use one decoy state method and set µ1 = 0.1
and µ2 = 0.01. If considering non-ideal CSS, we in-
clude vacuum state. From Fig. 1, we can see that the
4transmission distance is more than 400 km even with
the non-ideal CSS, while the transmission distance just
reaches 200 km with WCS in the same case.
Fig. 2. Comparison between standard statistical analysis and
Chernoff bound. We fix the security bound to ǫ = 2ε =
5.73 × 10−7.
The standard statistical analysis method [25] may not
well satisfy the long distance implementation of MDI-
QKD, because it is far from optimal to provide good
bounds in the case of small measurement data within a
reasonable time frame due to large attenuation. There-
fore, we exploit a large deviation theory, Chernoff bound,
to provide good bounds to estimate the parameter sta-
tistical fluctuation [26]. Let X1, · · ·, XL be independent
Bernoulli random variables, and let X = 1/L
∑
Xi be
the empirical mean of the variables and E(X) be the ex-
pected value of X. So we use the following inequalities,
Pr
(
X− E(X) ≥
√
2X ln
(
ε−
3
2
))
≤ ε,
Pr
(
E(X)−X ≥
√
2X ln (16ε−4)
)
≤ ε,
(18)
to preform the parameter estimation. We compare the
secure key rates with standard statistical analysis and
Chernoff bound in Fig. 2.
In conclusion, we have exploited CSS as the source
to improve transmission distance and secure key rate,
compared with WCS in the finite-data case. We ex-
ploit the standard statistical analysis method to ana-
lyze the secure key rates of CSS, WCS and non-ideal
CSS, respectively. Besides, we exploit the large devia-
tion theory, Chernoff bound to estimate the parameter
statistical fluctuation. Inspiringly, our scheme can be
generalized to any photon-number distribution sources
to perform MDI-QKD. With the developing technique
of practical CSS, our work suggests an inspiring step to-
wards the implementation of long distance MDI-QKD.
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